Furthering our examination of hybrid threats and irregular war, RAND’s Dave Johnson, one of my favorite analysts, has an excellent new paper out , “Military Capabilities for Hybrid War: Insights from the IDF in Lebanon and Gaza.” Prior to summer 2006, the IDF believed its future was fighting Palestinian terrorists, so, big cuts were made in funding for combined arms training, particularly in the heavy armored units. Air Force forward air controllers were removed from ground brigades. Counterterror operations in the West Bank and Gaza were highly centralized affairs, with the active involvement of Israeli leaders at the highest levels, which over the years had a stifling effect on small unit initiative. In Lebanon, the IDF faced an opponent with a combat mindset very different from Palestinian terrorists. Hezbollah fought as small, tactically competent units, with lots of firepower, using fortified positions, but also skillfully using the terrain to maneuver and close with Israeli ground forces. After Lebanon, the IDF set about correcting its many deficiencies.
View post:
Lessons From Hybrid Wars: The IDF in Lebanon and Gaza
Hello. I enjoy your blog. Was wondering if you wanted to earn some cash from it? I recently joined a program that pays out around 2 dollars every time one of my visitors completes a quick quiz to get access to quality content. Check out my blog for alot more info. Think it is good for this website. Regards